Accountability Systems Denver CO

A functionally effective system for the accountability of firefighters on the fireground is a much-debated issue nationwide. Our "workplace" is very dynamic, and we are one of few professions that regularly operate in an uncontrolled environment. Many different types and styles of accountability systems are available today. They range from simple manual-tag systems to sophisticated electronic-monitoring devices.

Most accountability systems, if used properly, can tell an incident commander how many firefighters are on the scene, who they are and even which piece of fire apparatus they arrived on. However, when a firefighter becomes lost, trapped or otherwise in distress in a hazardous environment, most systems fall short of being able to give command the exact identity of the member who is lost. How important is it for the incident commander to be able to positively identify a member in trouble? Won't we respond the same way to a report of a firefighter down no matter who it is? Not necessarily. Knowing exactly who you are looking for can be a critical piece of information.

This information played a major role at an incident that occurred in 1995. In this instance, a large career fire department responded to a "routine" house fire. During suppression operations, three members of Engine 17 became lost and ran out of air. Close to the time that the Engine 17 crew ran into trouble, three other firefighters entered the structure, fell through a hole and were pulled from a side window by members operating outside. During this time, a report of "firefighters down" was given over the radio. Some confusion ensued and the three firefighters pulled from the window were assumed to be the Engine 17 firefighters reported down. An "all clear" was given for the down firefighters and normal fire suppression operations were resumed. After being missing for 70 minutes, the lost Engine 17 crew members were found dead. The official U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) report on the incident stated, "The confusion over the identities of the individuals who had been rescued contributed significantly to the failure to recognize that Engine 17's crew was missing." (U.S. Fire Administration. Technical Report Series, Report 078, Three Firefighters Die in Pittsburgh House Fire, 1995.)

Adding to the confusion at this incident was the fact that 12 of the 17 personnel responding on the first-alarm rigs were not in their assigned spots that day. This is not uncommon. If you are a member of a career department, think about how many times the makeup of an engine or truck company changes due to vacations, sick leave, detached duty or personnel trading shifts. The crew of a single company may change several times in one duty shift for one reason or another. If your department is volunteer, your crews will change at any given time depending on who is available to respond to a call.

During a firefighter emergency, you may know, for instance, that a firefighter from Engine 1 is missing, but do you know which firefighter from Engine 1? How many times in line-of-duty-death incidents has "mistaken identity" been a factor causing a firefighter in a safe area to be mistaken for one who is still missing? In addition, knowing the actual identity of a member in distress can give an incident commander other valuable information. Does the missing member have two years of experience or 20? Is the firefighter known to have any type of medical problems? If you know the firefighter's identity, you may be able to figure out where he or she was last seen or supposed to be working.

Accountability Systems

Accountability systems in use today vary greatly. Two commonly used types are manual-tag systems and electronic-transmitting personal alert safety system (PASS) devices. Manual-tag systems generally consist of some type of identification tag containing information about the member, such as a name, badge number, department and possibly even a photo. In many paid departments, the tag is usually clipped or attached to an apparatus accountability ring or board at the beginning of the duty shift. Members of a volunteer department, upon receiving a call, will generally assemble a crew at the station and attach their tags to the apparatus ring/board before responding. This system identifies which firefighters are staffing an apparatus at an incident.

A more sophisticated, and usually more expensive, system is one that uses electronic-transmitting PASS devices. These transmitting PASS (TPASS) devices are usually attached to each self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) on an apparatus. They operate much the same as other PASS devices, sounding an audible alarm when a firefighter remains motionless for a specified period. However, in addition to sounding an audible alarm, they send a radio signal to a remote base receiver. This base receiver, which may look similar to a laptop computer, is maintained at the incident command post and monitored by someone dedicated solely to accountability.

Each TPASS device is pre-programmed with the apparatus identification and the specific position on the apparatus where the SCBA it is attached to is located. For instance, a four-person rig (e.g., Engine 31) will have four SCBA, each with its own TPASS device. Each TPASS will be programmed with its own identification — Engine 31 Officer, Engine 31 Driver, Engine 31 Firefighter 1 or Engine 31 Firefighter 2. As members arrive at an incident, the base receiver screen will show all TPASS devices that are operating on the fireground. In the event a TPASS goes into alarm mode, the base receiver will give an audible and visual alarm that there is a firefighter emergency and identify the TPASS that is in alarm mode. Unless a TPASS is purchased, programmed and issued to each individual member for their use only, which is an expensive option, the base receiver will not give the name of the member in distress; rather it displays only the TPASS identifier—Engine 31 Firefighter 1.

Information Gap

Both of these systems, if used properly, work well. In addition, some departments use both systems in a complementary manner. If the TPASS device of the Engine 31 Driver goes into alert mode, the accountability officer can look at the accountability tag ring/board for Engine 31 and see which four members arrived on that rig.

But here is where an information gap occurs. If four tags are attached to Engine 31's ring or board, which of those four members is wearing the Engine 31 Driver SCBA with the corresponding TPASS device attached to it? In other words, who was in the driver's seat on the rig and is now wearing the driver's assigned SCBA? It is not uncommon in career departments to have days when the officer is sick or on vacation. In these instances, the driver could slide over to the officer's seat to become the acting officer and a firefighter could be moved up to the driver's seat. Or, the officer and driver may be out and the crew is comprised of four firefighters. Which one of those four is the officer, driver, firefighter 1 or firefighter 2? In volunteer departments, you usually never know who will be in any of these positions until the alarm comes in. During a firefighter emergency, you won't cannot be 100% sure of who you are looking for, setting ourselves up for a case of "mistaken identity." Some may say that because they are using the electronic-transmitting PASS device system, they have narrowed the identity search and the likelihood of "mistaken identity" is slight.

Let's take a look at another incident where this type of electronic accountability system was being used. In 2004, a large career department had two captains injured and one firefighter die in the line of duty while operating at a nightclub fire. The department had in use at this incident an electronic-transmitting PASS device system, and an engine company was assigned to monitor the system and act as the rapid intervention team. During the suppression operations, the captains and firefighter became lost, disoriented or otherwise in distress in the building. The two captains were pulled from the building and transported to hospitals for treatment. The building was then ordered to be evacuated. During a subsequent personnel accountability report (PAR), it was reported that all personnel were accounted for. The victim, at this time, was still in the building, but the report by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) states, "A firefighter was mistaken as the victim when a PAR was requested. The victim was not assigned to the crew that had responded on Engine 50. He had arrived at work early and relieved the firefighter assigned to this crew." (NIOSH. Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation, Career Fire Fighter Dies and Two Career Captains are Injured While Fighting Nightclub Arson Fire-Texas, Sept. 9, 2005.)

Thirteen minutes later, it was discovered that the victim was not accounted for. The NIOSH report goes on to state, "The (electronic accountability) base unit had been reset…The operator, who had reset the alarm, surmised that the electronic PASS devices belonged to the two injured (captains) being transported to the hospital." In its recommendations on this incident, NIOSH investigators noted, "Each electronic PASS device is assigned an identifier (e.g., E50A that identifies the captain from Engine 50). However, the PASS device does not identify the individual by name." No matter how sophisticated our technology is, we must always remember that "Murphy" is watching, and anything that can go wrong will go wrong.

Solution

How then do we narrow the search without further complicating the system? If you are using these two types of systems together, there is a simple and, most importantly, inexpensive way to ensure that you know exactly who is missing during a firefighter emergency. The solution is simply color coding or labeling.

If you use an apparatus tag collector ring, bridging the gap between the manual tag system and the electronic monitoring system could be accomplished by having four different-color rings attached to the main apparatus tag collector ring. Each color would indicate a different position on the apparatus that would correspond with the identifiers of each TPASS device. For instance, red for the officer, blue for the driver, green for firefighter 1 and yellow for firefighter 2. An alternative to color coding would be to label the four rings with the appropriate title of Officer, Driver, FF1 and FF2. If you use an apparatus accountability board where tags or name strips are attached, simply color code or label the board to indicate the different positions. Each member of the crew would ensure that their accountability tag is attached to the colored/labeled ring representing the position they are actually occupying on the apparatus at any time during the shift, or for volunteer departments, before the response begins. With this system, if the electronic base receiver indicates that the Engine 31 officer's TPASS device is in alarm mode, the accountability officer need only see whose tag is attached to the officer ring on Engine 31's main tag collector ring.

It is a good idea to mark the outside of each TPASS device indicating its programmed identifier. This color-coding/labeling system would also apply to departments that may not be using the electronic transmitting PASS devices, but do have portable radios assigned to each riding position on the apparatus. Many portable radios have an "emergency button" that members can press if they get into trouble in a building. When this button is pressed, the dispatcher is alerted and will see the radio's pre-programmed identifier, similar to the TPASS identifier. Using the color-coded or labeled tag system, the incident commander can identify who activated a radio's emergency button.

If you are using both TPASS devices and portable radios with the "emergency button" feature, make sure that both are marked with their identifiers and that each member ensures at shift change that the TPASS and portable radio match. If not, when the TPASS goes into alarm mode, it may indicate Engine 31 Firefighter 2, and the same member's portable radio may indicate to the dispatcher that it is Engine 31 Firefighter 1. In that case, the incident commander wouldn't be sure whether one or two firefighters are missing and who exactly they are. Again, we would be setting ourselves up for "mistaken identity."

Conclusion

Being able to identify which of your personnel is missing on the fireground is a vital piece of information for any incident commander. We must be able to do it quickly and with some degree of accuracy. As with anything, this system is subject to human failure. It won't work if personnel don't ensure that their tags are attached to the correct color-coded or labeled ring or area on the board, so some training and discipline are necessary.

Knowing who is missing is important, but it is only one part of a functionally effective accountability system. Tags and technology are great enhancements to help keep us safe, but technology is no substitute for a disciplined command structure that gives assignments, receives status and location reports from its operating crews, doesn't allow freelancing, and has company officers who know where their people are at all times.

CHRIS LANGLOIS has 19 years of volunteer and career fire service experience in Louisiana and Nebraska. He is a firefighter/paramedic with the Omaha, NE, Fire Department and a Rescue Specialist with Nebraska USAR Task Force 1. Langlois is IFSAC certified at the Firefighter II, Officer II, and Instructor I levels. He holds an associate's degree in fire science and a bachelor's degree in public administration/fire science, and is studying for a master's degree in executive fire service leadership. He may be contacted at ofd888@cox.net.